Authentication system for a multiuser device

ABSTRACT

A method including encrypting, by a multiuser device, a first folder based on utilizing a first symmetric key and a second folder based on utilizing a second symmetric key, the first folder and the second folder being stored on the multiuser device; encrypting, by the multiuser device, the first symmetric key based on utilizing a first trusted key and the second symmetric key based on utilizing a second trusted key; and providing access, by the multiuser device, to the encrypted first folder by decrypting the encrypted first symmetric key based on verifying first biometric information and to the encrypted second folder by decrypting the encrypted second symmetric key based on verifying second biometric information, the first biometric information being different from the second biometric information. Various other aspects and techniques are contemplated.

CROSS REFERENCE

This application is a continuation of U.S. Non-Provisional patentapplication Ser. No. 17/830,277, filed on Jun. 1, 2022, and titled“Authentication System For A Multiuser Device,” the entire contents ofwhich are incorporated herein by reference.

FIELD OF DISCLOSURE

Aspects of the present disclosure generally relate to use of computerhardware and/or software for communications, and in particular toproviding an authentication system for a multiuser device.

BACKGROUND

Various methods of cryptography (e.g., encrypting and decrypting data)are known. Encryption may be associated with changing the data frombeing in a transparently readable format to being in an encoded,unreadable format with the help of an encryption algorithm. Decryptionmay be associated with changing the data from being in the encoded,unreadable format to being in the transparently readable format with thehelp of a decryption algorithm. Encoded/encrypted data may bedecoded/decrypted with a given decryption key. In an example, symmetriccryptography may utilize encryption and decryption algorithms that relyon a single private key for encryption and decryption of data. Symmetriccryptography is considered to be relatively speedy. One example of anencryption and decryption algorithm utilized by symmetric encryption maybe an AES encryption cipher. On the other hand, asymmetric cryptographymay utilize encryption and decryption algorithms that rely on twoseparate but mathematically-related keys for encryption and decryptionof data. For instance, data encrypted using a public key may bedecrypted using a separate but mathematically-related private key. Thepublic key may be publicly available through a directory, while theprivate key may remain confidential and accessible by only an owner ofthe private key. Asymmetric encryption may also be referred to as publickey cryptography. One example of an encryption and decryption algorithmutilized by asymmetric encryption may be Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)protocol.

SUMMARY

In one aspect, the present disclosure contemplates a method includingdecrypting, by a user device based at least in part on utilizing amaster key, an assigned private key associated with the user device;decrypting, by a user device based at least in part on utilizing atrusted key, a double-encrypted symmetric key to determine asingle-encrypted symmetric key; decrypting, by the user device based atleast in part on utilizing the assigned private key, thesingle-encrypted symmetric key to determine a symmetric key; anddecrypting, by the user device based at least in part on utilizing thesymmetric key, an encrypted folder stored on the user device to provideaccess to data included in the encrypted folder.

In another aspect, the present disclosure contemplates a devicecomprising a memory and a processor communicatively coupled to thememory, the processor being configured to: decrypt, based at least inpart on utilizing a master key, an assigned private key associated withthe user device; decrypt, based at least in part on utilizing a trustedkey, a double-encrypted symmetric key to determine a single-encryptedsymmetric key; decrypt, based at least in part on utilizing the assignedprivate key, the single-encrypted symmetric key to determine a symmetrickey; and decrypt, based at least in part on utilizing the symmetric key,an encrypted folder stored on the user device to provide access to dataincluded in the encrypted folder.

In another aspect, the present disclosure contemplates a non-transitorycomputer readable medium storing instructions, which when executed by aprocessor cause the processor to: decrypt, based at least in part onutilizing a master key, an assigned private key associated with the userdevice; decrypt, based at least in part on utilizing a trusted key, adouble-encrypted symmetric key to determine a single-encrypted symmetrickey; decrypt, based at least in part on utilizing the assigned privatekey, the single-encrypted symmetric key to determine a symmetric key;and decrypt, based at least in part on utilizing the symmetric key, anencrypted folder stored on the user device to provide access to dataincluded in the encrypted folder.

It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description andthe following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory innature and are intended to provide an understanding of the presentdisclosure without limiting the scope thereof. In that regard,additional aspects, features, and advantages of the present disclosurewill be apparent to one skilled in the art from the following detaileddescription.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings illustrate aspects of systems, devices,methods, and/or mediums disclosed herein and together with thedescription, serve to explain the principles of the present disclosure.Throughout this description, like elements, in whatever aspectdescribed, refer to common elements wherever referred to and referencedby the same reference number. The characteristics, attributes,functions, interrelations ascribed to a particular element in onelocation apply to those elements when referred to by the same referencenumber in another location unless specifically stated otherwise.

The figures referenced below are drawn for ease of explanation of thebasic teachings of the present disclosure; the extensions of the figureswith respect to number, position, relationship, and dimensions of theparts to form the following aspects may be explained or may be withinthe skill of the art after the following description has been read andunderstood. Further, exact dimensions and dimensional proportions toconform to specific force, weight, strength, and similar requirementswill likewise be within the skill of the art after the followingdescription has been read and understood.

The following is a brief description of each figure used to describe thepresent disclosure, and thus, is being presented for illustrativepurposes only and should not be limitative of the scope of the presentdisclosure.

FIG. 1 is an illustration of an example system associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure.

FIG. 2 is an illustration of an example flow associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure.

FIG. 3 is an illustration of an example process associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure.

FIG. 4 is an illustration of an example process associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure.

FIG. 5 is an illustration of an example process associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure.

FIG. 6 is an illustration of example devices associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

For the purposes of promoting an understanding of the principles of thepresent disclosure, reference will now be made to the aspectsillustrated in the drawings, and specific language may be used todescribe the same. It will nevertheless be understood that no limitationof the scope of the disclosure is intended. Any alterations and furthermodifications to the described devices, instruments, methods, and anyfurther application of the principles of the present disclosure arefully contemplated as would normally occur to one skilled in the art towhich the disclosure relates. In particular, it is fully contemplatedthat the features, components, and/or steps described with respect toone aspect may be combined with the features, components, and/or stepsdescribed with respect to other aspects of the present disclosure. Forthe sake of brevity, however, the numerous iterations of thesecombinations may not be described separately. For simplicity, in someinstances the same reference numbers are used throughout the drawings torefer to the same or like parts.

FIG. 1 is an illustration of an example system 100 associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure. The system 100 includes a multiuserdevice 102, a security infrastructure 110, and a DSSP 116 communicatingwith each other over a network 120. In some aspects, the multiuserdevice 102 and the DSSP 116 may communicate with one another forpurposes of obtaining and/or providing network services. The networkservices may include any service provided over a network (e.g.,Internet) such as, for example, data storage and protection services. Insome aspects, the multiuser device 102 and the security infrastructure110 may communicate with one another for purposes of obtaining and/orproviding cyber security services. As discussed in detail with respectto FIG. 2 , the cyber security services may include, for example, anauthentication service during which the security infrastructure 110enables secure authentication for access to data stored in a localstorage on the multiuser device 102.

In some aspects, the multiuser device 102 may be accessible by multipleusers. The multiuser device 102 may include and/or be associated with asecurity application 104, a biometric unit 106, and a trusted platformmodule (TPM) device 108 communicatively coupled to an associatedprocessor (e.g., processor 620) and/or memory (e.g., memory 630). Insome aspects, the associated processor and/or memory may be local to themultiuser device 102. In some aspects, the associated processor and/ormemory may be located remotely with respect to the multiuser device 102.The security infrastructure 110 may include a processing unit 112 and adatabase (e.g., memory) 114. The security infrastructure 110 mayconfigure and provide the security application 104 for installation toenable the multiuser device 102 to communicate with an applicationprogramming interface (API) (not shown) included in the securityinfrastructure 110 and/or for obtaining the cyber security services.

The multiuser device 102 may be a physical computing device capable ofhosting the security application 104 and of connecting to the network120. The multiuser device 102 may be, for example, a laptop, a mobilephone, a tablet computer, a desktop computer, a smart device, a router,or the like. In some aspects, the multiuser device 102 may include, forexample, Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices such as VSP smart homeappliances, smart home security systems, autonomous vehicles, smarthealth monitors, smart factory equipment, wireless inventory trackers,biometric cyber security scanners, or the like. The multiuser device 102may include and/or may be associated with a communication interface tocommunicate (e.g., receive and/or transmit) data.

In some aspects, the security infrastructure 110 may configure andprovide the multiuser device 102 with the security application 104 to beinstalled on the multiuser device 102. As discussed with respect to FIG.2 , the security application 104 may be configured to enable utilizationof cryptographic keys, the biometric unit 106, and/or the TPM device 108by (an operating system of) the multiuser device 102 to enable secureauthentication for access to data stored in a local storage on themultiuser device 102. The security application 104 and/or the securityinfrastructure 110 may utilize one or more encryption and decryptionalgorithms to encrypt and decrypt data. The encryption algorithms anddecryption algorithms may employ standards such as, for example, dataencryption standards (DES), advanced encryption standards (AES),Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) encryption standard, Open PGP standards,file encryption overview, disk encryption overview, email encryptionoverview, etc. Some examples of the security algorithms include a tripledata encryption standard (DES) algorithm, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)encryption algorithm, advanced encryption standards (AES) algorithms,Twofish encryption algorithms, Blowfish encryption algorithms, IDEAencryption algorithms, MD5 encryption algorithms, HMAC encryptionalgorithms, etc.

The biometric unit 106 may enable identification, authentication, and/oraccess control. In some aspects, the biometric unit 106 may include abiometric sensor for sensing and/or capturing biometric informationassociated with a user. Such biometric information may include, forexample, fingerprint, palm print, finger shape, palm shape, voice,retina, iris, face image, sound, dynamic signature, blood vesselpattern, keystroke, or a combination thereof. The biometric unit 106 mayutilize the associated processor to correlate the captured biometricinformation with user information associated with an authorized user,and to store a correlation of the biometric information with the userinformation in the associated memory. Further, the biometric unit 106may enable comparison of a received biometric information with storedbiometric information to verify and/or authenticate that the receivedbiometric information is associated with the user information (e.g.,that the received biometric information belongs to the authorized user).

The TPM device 108 may include a dedicated controller utilizingintegrated cryptographic keys (e.g., master keys) and/or cryptographicalgorithms to operate as a secure crypto processor. The TPM device 108may carry out cryptographic operations, embedded in a packaging withmultiple physical security measures, which give it a degree of tamperresistance. In some aspects, the TPM device 108 may refrain fromcommunicating the cryptographic keys (e.g., master keys, etc.) and/orthe cryptographic algorithms externally (e.g., external to the TPMdevice 108).

The security infrastructure 110 may include the processing unit 112 andthe database 114. The processing unit 112 may include a logicalcomponent configured to perform complex operations to evaluate variousfactors associated with providing the cyber security services. Thedatabase 114 may store various pieces of information associated withproviding the cyber security services, including security algorithms,encrypted content, and/or encryption/decryption key information. Thesecurity infrastructure 110 may include or be associated with acommunication interface (e.g., communication interface 670) tocommunicate (e.g., transmit and/or receive) data.

The DSSP 116 may own and operate an infrastructure associated withproviding the data storage and protection services. To access the datastorage and protection services, the DSSP 116 may enable the multiuserdevice 102 to set up an authentication system. Upon communication ofcredentials by the multiuser device 102, the DSSP 116 may authenticatethe credentials and provide the multiuser device 102 with access to thedata storage and protection services when the credentials aresuccessfully authenticated.

The network 120 may be wired or wireless network. In some aspects, thenetwork 120 may include one or more of, for example, a phone line, alocal-area network (LAN), a wide-area network (WAN), a metropolitan-areanetwork (MAN), a home-area network (HAN), Internet, Intranet, Extranet,and Internetwork. In some aspects, the network 120 may include a digitaltelecommunication network that permits several nodes to share and accessresources.

As indicated above, FIG. 1 is provided as an example. Other examples maydiffer from what is described with regard to FIG. 1 .

A user device may receive data storage services from a data storageservice provider (DSSP). Such data storage services may include cloudstorage services that enable the user device to utilize, for example,the Internet to store data in a cloud storage (e.g., servers and/orstorage devices) managed by the DSSP. The data storage services may alsobe referred to as cloud backup services, online data storage services,online drive storages, file hosting services, file storage services, orthe like. The DSSP may attempt to protect the stored data by requiringthe user device to provide credentials (e.g., username, password,one-time passwords, one-time tokens, or the like) to gain authorizedaccess to the data stored in the cloud storage. The cloud storage may beaccessible via use of a client interface (e.g., a web interface and/oran application interface).

As part of the data storage services, the DSSP may enable the userdevice to synchronize the cloud storage with a local storage on the userdevice such that the data stored in the cloud storage is also stored inthe local storage. In this case, upon synchronization, the user devicemay access the data via the local storage when, for example, the userdevice is unable to connect to the Internet or a server associated withthe cloud storage may be out of service.

Such accessing of data via the local storage may result in privateinformation becoming compromised. In an example, the user device may bea multiuser device accessible by multiple users. For instance, a firstuser and a second user may have access to the multiuser device. In thiscase, the first user may synchronize a first cloud storage with a firstlocal storage, which may store first private data associated with thefirst user. Similarly, the second user may synchronize a second cloudstorage with a second local storage, which may store second private dataassociated with the second user. As a result, the first user may accessthe second private data stored in the second local storage via access tothe multiuser device, thereby compromising the second private data.Similarly, the second user may access the first private data stored inthe first local storage via access to the multiuser device, therebycompromising the first private data.

As a result, an integrity associated with the first private data and/orthe second private data may be compromised. To restore the integrity,the multiuser device and/or the DSSP may expend resources (e.g.,management resources, memory resources, computational/processingresources, power consumption resources, system bandwidth, networkresources, financial resources, time resources, etc.) that may otherwisebe utilized to perform more suitable tasks.

In some cases, the first user and the second user may utilize the samecredentials to access the multiuser device. In other cases, the firstuser and the second user may utilize different credentials to access themultiuser device. The first private data and/or the second private datamay include, for example, personal and/or sensitive information such ascontact information (e.g., name, address, telephone number emailaddress, etc.), financial information (e.g., bank account numbers,etc.), access information (e.g., account information, username,password, etc.), literature information (e.g., documents, files,photographs, etc.), or a combination thereof.

Various aspects of systems and techniques discussed in the presentdisclosure provide an authentication system for a multiuser device. Theauthentication system for the multiuser device may include a securityinfrastructure and/or a security application that is installed on themultiuser device. In some aspects, the security infrastructure mayconfigure and provide the multiuser device with the securityapplication. The security application may be configured to enableutilization of cryptographic keys, a biometric unit, and/or a TPM deviceby (an operating system of) the multiuser device to enable secureauthentication for access to data stored in a local storage on themultiuser device. As discussed below in further detail, the securityapplication may utilize respective cryptographic keys, the biometricunit, and/or the TPM device to encrypt respective local foldersassociated with the respective multiple users of the multiuser device.In an example, the security application may authenticate and provideaccess to a first user associated with first private data stored in afirst local storage based at least in part on utilizing firstcryptographic keys, the biometric unit, and/or the TPM device.Similarly, the security application may authenticate and provide accessto a second user associated with second private data stored in a secondlocal storage based at least in part on utilizing second cryptographickeys, the biometric unit, and/or the TPM device. In this way, thesecurity application may avoid the first user from accessing the secondprivate data stored in the second local storage via the first user'saccess to the multiuser device, thereby preventing the second privatedata from becoming compromised. Similarly, the security application mayavoid the second user from accessing the first private data stored inthe first local storage via the second user's access to the multiuserdevice, thereby preventing the first private data from becomingcompromised. As a result, the security application may enable protectionof integrity associated with the first private data and/or the secondprivate data, thereby enabling the multiuser device and/or the DSSP toefficiently expend resources (e.g., management resources, memoryresources, computational/processing resources, power consumptionresources, system bandwidth, network resources, financial resources,time resources, etc.) to perform suitable tasks associated withproviding the cyber security services.

In some aspects, a processor executing the security application maydecrypt, based at least in part on utilizing a master key, an assignedprivate key associated with the user device; decrypt, based at least inpart on utilizing a trusted key, a double-encrypted symmetric key todetermine a single-encrypted symmetric key; decrypt, based at least inpart on utilizing the assigned private key, the single-encryptedsymmetric key to determine a symmetric key; and decrypt, based at leastin part on utilizing the symmetric key, an encrypted folder stored onthe user device to provide access to data included in the encryptedfolder.

FIG. 2 is an illustration of an example flow 200 associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure. The example flow 200 may include amultiuser device 102 obtaining cyber security services from a securityinfrastructure (e.g., security infrastructure 110). In some aspects,obtaining the cyber security services may include receiving a configuredsecurity application 104 from the security infrastructure for enablingsecure authentication for access to data stored in a local storage onthe multiuser device 102. As discussed above with respect to FIG. 1 ,the multiuser device 102 may include the security application 104, abiometric unit 106 (not shown), and a TPM device 108.

In some aspects, the stateless infrastructure 110 may configure andprovide the security application 104 to be installed on the multiuserdevice 102. The security application 104 may enable the multiuser device102 to receive information to be processed by the security application104 and/or by the stateless infrastructure 110. The security application104 may include a graphical interface to receive the information via alocal input interface (e.g., touch screen, keyboard, mouse, pointer,etc.) associated with the multiuser device 102. The information may bereceived via text input or via a selection from among a plurality ofoptions (e.g., pull down menu, etc.). In some aspects, the securityapplication 104 may activate and/or enable, at a time associated withthe registration (e.g., after the registration), the graphical interfacefor receiving the information. For instance, the security application104 may cause a screen (e.g., local screen) associated with themultiuser device 102 to display, for example, a pop-up message torequest entry of the information. Further, the security application 104may enable transmission of at least a portion of the information to thestateless infrastructure 110.

The multiuser device 102 may receive data storage and protectionservices from a DSSP (e.g., DSSP 116). As part of the data storage andprotection services, the DSSP may enable the multiuser device tosynchronize cloud storages with respective local storages (e.g., localfolders) on the multiuser device such that the data stored in the cloudstorages is also stored in the respective local storages. In this case,upon synchronization, multiple users with authorized access to themultiuser device may access the data stored in the respective localstorages when, for example, the multiuser device is unable to connect tothe Internet or a server associated with the cloud storage may be out ofservice.

As discussed below, the security application 104 may utilize respectivecryptographic keys, the biometric unit 106, and/or the TPM device 108 toencrypt respective local folders associated with the respective multipleusers. In an example, the security application 104 may authenticate andprovide access to a first user associated with first private data storedin an encrypted first local folder based at least in part on utilizingfirst cryptographic keys, the biometric unit 106, and/or the TPM device108. Similarly, the security application 104 may authenticate andprovide access to a second user associated with second private datastored in an encrypted second local folder based at least in part onutilizing second cryptographic keys, the biometric unit 106, and/or theTPM device 108. In some aspects, the first cryptographic keys may bedifferent with respect to the second cryptographic keys.

As shown by reference numeral 210, the security application 104 mayreceive respective registration information associated with registeringrespective accounts for the multiple users having authorized access tothe multiuser device 102. In an example, the security application 104may register a first account associated with the first user havingauthorized access to the multiuser device 102. In some aspects, duringregistration of the first account, the security application 104 mayreceive first registration information such as, for example, identity ofthe first user, a phone number associated with the first user, an emailaddress associated with the first user, or a combination thereof.

Similarly, the security application 104 may register a second accountassociated with the second user having authorized access to themultiuser device 102. In some aspects, during registration of the secondaccount, the security application 104 may receive second registrationinformation such as, for example, identity of the second user, a phonenumber associated with the second user, an email address associated withthe second user, or a combination thereof.

As shown by reference numeral 220, the security application 104 maydetermine respective cryptographic keys for the registered account. Inan example, the security application 104 may determine and assign aunique first asymmetric assigned key pair to the first account. In someaspects, the security application 104 may utilize a key derivationfunction to determine the first assigned key pair. The first assignedkey pair may be specific to the first account and may include a firstassigned public key and first assigned private key. The first assignedpublic key and the first assigned private key may be associated witheach other via, for example, a mathematical function. As a result, dataencrypted using the first assigned public key may be decrypted byutilizing the first assigned private key.

Further, the security application 104 may request and receive a firstmaster string of alphanumeric characters from the first user. In someaspects, the first master string may be unique and be associated withthe first account. Based at least in part on receiving the first masterstring, the security application 104 may determine a first master key.In some aspects, the security application 104 may utilize a passwordderivation function and/or a key derivation function to determine thefirst master key based at least in part on the first master string. Thepassword derivation function and/or the key derivation function mayperform hashing of the first master string to determine the first masterkey. The security application 104 may utilize the first master key toencrypt the first assigned private key associated with the firstaccount.

Similarly, the security application 104 may determine and assign aunique second asymmetric assigned key pair to the second account. Insome aspects, the security application 104 may utilize a key derivationfunction to determine the second assigned key pair. The second assignedkey pair may be specific to the second account and may include a secondassigned public key and second assigned private key. The second assignedpublic key and the second assigned private key may be associated witheach other via, for example, a mathematical function. As a result, dataencrypted using the second assigned public key may be decrypted byutilizing the second assigned private key.

Further, the security application 104 may request and receive a secondmaster string of alphanumeric characters from the second user. In someaspects, the second master string may be unique and be associated withthe second account. Based at least in part on receiving the secondmaster string, the security application 104 may determine a secondmaster key. In some aspects, the security application 104 may utilize apassword derivation function and/or a key derivation function todetermine the second master key based at least in part on the secondmaster string. The password derivation function and/or the keyderivation function may perform hashing of the second master string todetermine the second master key. The security application 104 mayutilize the second master key to encrypt the second assigned private keyassociated with the second account.

The security application 104 may also determine a first symmetric keyassociated with the first account. In some aspects, the securityapplication 104 may utilize a random bit generator to determine thefirst symmetric key. As a result, the first symmetric key may be arandom key including a sequence of unpredictable and unbiasedinformation. The security application 104 may utilize the firstsymmetric key to encrypt the first local folder, stored in a memory(e.g., memory 630) associated with the multiuser device.

Similarly, the security application 104 may determine a second symmetrickey associated with the second account. In some aspects, the securityapplication 104 may utilize the random bit generator to determine thesecond symmetric key. As a result, the second symmetric key may be arandom key including a sequence of unpredictable and unbiasedinformation. The security application 104 may utilize the secondsymmetric key to encrypt the second local folder, stored in the memory(e.g., memory 630) associated with the multiuser device.

As shown by reference numeral 230, the security application 104 mayutilize an operating system being utilized by the multiuser device 102to associate verification of biometric information with operation of theTPM device 108. In some aspects, the security application 104 maydetermine availability of the biometric unit 106 and of the TPM device108. To determine availability of the biometric unit 106 and of the TPMdevice 108, the security application 104 may request and receive, fromthe operating system, information indicating that the biometric unit 106and of the TPM device 108 are associated with the operating system.

Based at least in part on determining availability of the biometric unit106 and of the TPM device 108, the security application 104 may enableutilization of the biometric unit 106 and/or the TPM device 108 toenable authentication for access to a local storage. In an example, thesecurity application 104 may associate verification of biometricinformation with encrypting of data by the TPM device 108 and/or withdecrypting of data by the TPM device 108. The associating ofverification of biometric information with operation of the TPM device108 may be such that a request for the TPM device 108 to encrypt dataand/or to decrypt data is to indicate a result of a successfulverification of biometric information.

To associate verification of biometric information with operation of theTPM device 108, the security application 104 may, for example, display apop-up message on a screen associated with the multiuser device 102 torequest biometric information from an authorized user of the multiuserdevice 102. In this case, the security application 104 may request firstbiometric information from the first user associated with the firstaccount and second biometric information from the second user associatedwith the second account. Further, the security application 104 mayenable (e.g., cause) the operating system to activate the biometric unit106 to sense the biometric information. The security application 104 maycorrelate and store, in the associated memory, the biometric informationthat belongs to the authorized user as authentic biometric information.In an example, the security application 104 may determine a firstcorrelation between the first biometric information and the firstaccount, and may store the first correlation in the associated memory asauthentic first biometric information. Similarly, the securityapplication 104 may determine a second correlation between the secondbiometric information and the second account, and may store the secondcorrelation in the associated memory as authentic second biometricinformation.

When the security application 104 is to transmit a request for the TPMdevice 108 to encrypt data and/or to decrypt data, the securityapplication 104 may verify biometric information in real time. In anexample, to verify the biometric information, the security application104 may enable (e.g., cause) the operating system to activate thebiometric unit 106 to receive biometric information in real time (e.g.,at a time associated with transmitting the request). Further, thesecurity application 104 may compare the received biometric informationwith the authentic biometric information stored in the associatedmemory. When the received biometric information matches (e.g., is thesame as) the stored authentic biometric information (e.g., successfulauthentication), the security application 104 may determine that thereceived biometric information belongs to the authorized user and mayselect to transmit the request for the TPM device to encrypt data and/ordecrypt data. In some aspects, the request may include and/or indicate aresult of the received biometric information matching the authenticbiometric information to the TPM device 108. Alternatively, when thereceived biometric information fails to match (e.g., is different from)the stored authentic biometric information (e.g., unsuccessfulauthentication), the security application 104 may determine that thereceived biometric information does not belong to the authorized userand may select to refrain from transmitting the request for the TPMdevice to encrypt data and/or to decrypt data.

In an example, when the security application 104 is to transmit arequest for the TPM device 108 to encrypt data and/or decrypt dataassociated with the first account, the security application 104 mayverify the first biometric information in real time (e.g., at a timeassociated with transmitting the request), as discussed above.Similarly, when the security application 104 is to transmit a requestfor the TPM device 108 to encrypt data and/or decrypt data associatedwith the second account, the security application 104 may verify thesecond biometric information in real time (e.g., at a time associatedwith transmitting the request), as discussed above.

As shown by reference numeral 240, the security application may requestthe TPM device 108 to determine trusted keys. In an example, for thefirst account, the security application 104 may request the TPM device108 to determine a first trusted key. In some aspects, the first trustedkey may include a first trusted symmetric key. In some aspects, thefirst trusted key may include a first trusted key pair, including afirst trusted public key and a first trusted private key. The firsttrusted public key and the first trusted private key may be associatedwith each other via, for example, a mathematical function. As a result,data encrypted using the first trusted public key may be decrypted byutilizing the first trusted private key. In some aspects, the TPM device108 may retain possession of the first trusted key (e.g., the TPM device108 may keep the first trusted key confidential). Based at least in parton determining the first trusted key, the TPM device 108 may return tothe security application 104 a unique first identifier associated with(e.g., that identifies) the first trusted key. In some aspects, thefirst trusted key and/or the first identifier may be specific to (e.g.,may be utilized by) the security application 104 and/or to the multiuserdevice 102.

Similarly, for the second account, the security application 104 mayrequest the TPM device 108 to determine a second trusted key. In someaspects, the second trusted key may include a second trusted symmetrickey. In some aspects, the second trusted key may include a secondtrusted key pair, including a second trusted public key and a secondtrusted private key. The second trusted public key and the secondtrusted private key may be associated with each other via, for example,a mathematical function. As a result, data encrypted using the secondtrusted public key may be decrypted by utilizing the second trustedprivate key. In some aspects, the TPM device 108 may retain possessionof the second trusted key (e.g., the TPM device 108 may keep the secondtrusted key confidential). Based at least in part on determining thesecond trusted key, the TPM device 108 may return to the securityapplication 104 a unique second identifier associated with (e.g., thatidentifies) the second trusted key. In some aspects, the second trustedkey and/or the second identifier may be specific to (e.g., may beutilized by) the security application 104 and/or to the multiuser device102.

As shown by reference numeral 250, the security application 104 maysecure the local folders. As discussed above, the security application104 may utilize the first symmetric key to encrypt the first localfolder. To further secure the first local folder, the securityapplication 104 may encrypt the first symmetric key based at least inpart on utilizing the first assigned public key, which is associatedwith the first user and/or the first account, to determine asingle-encrypted first symmetric key.

Also, the security application 104 may transmit a first encryptionrequest for the TPM device 108 to encrypt the single-encrypted firstsymmetric key based at least in part on utilizing the first trusted keyto determine a double-encrypted first symmetric key. The firstencryption request may include the unique first identifier inassociation with the single-encrypted first symmetric key to indicate tothe TPM device 108 that the single-encrypted first symmetric key is tobe encrypted based at least in part on utilizing the first trusted keythat is associated with (e.g., identified by) the unique firstidentifier.

The first encryption request may also include and/or indicate a resultof the security application 104 verifying biometric information. In anexample, the security application 104 may receive and verify biometricinformation in real time (e.g., while transmitting the first encryptionrequest), as discussed elsewhere herein. When received biometricinformation matches the stored authentic first biometric information,the security application 104 may determine that the received biometricinformation belongs to the first user associated with the first localstorage folder, and may select to transmit the first encryption request.Further, the first encryption request may include and/or indicate theresult of the successful verification of the received biometricinformation.

Based at least in part on receiving the first encryption request, theTPM device 108 may determine, from the included and/or indicated resultof the successful verification, that the received biometric informationmatches the stored authentic first biometric information. Further, theTPM device 108 may determine that the single-encrypted first symmetrickey is to be encrypted by utilizing the first trusted key associatedwith the unique first identifier, as indicated by the first encryptionrequest. As a result, the TPM device 108 may utilize the first trustedkey to encrypt the single-encrypted first symmetric key.

When the first trusted key includes the first trusted symmetric key, theTPM device 108 may utilize the first trusted symmetric key to encryptthe single-encrypted first symmetric key. When the first trusted keyincludes the first trusted key pair, the TPM device 108 may encrypt thesingle-encrypted first symmetric key by utilizing the first trustedpublic key to determine the double-encrypted first symmetric key. Insome aspects, the TPM device 108 may provide the double-encrypted firstsymmetric key to the security application 104.

The security application 104 may store the double-encrypted firstsymmetric key in a memory (e.g., memory 630) associated with themultiuser device 102. Because the first trusted key is associated withthe TPM device 108, utilizing the first trusted key to encrypt thesingle-encrypted first symmetric key renders the first local folderdevice-specific such that data stored in the first local folder may beaccessed and/or decrypted by using the multiuser device 102.

Similarly, as discussed above, the security application 104 may utilizethe second symmetric key to encrypt the second local folder. To furthersecure the second local folder, the security application 104 may encryptthe second symmetric key based at least in part on utilizing the secondassigned public key, which is associated with the second user and/or thesecond account, to determine a single-encrypted second symmetric key.

Also, the security application 104 may transmit a second encryptionrequest for the TPM device 108 to encrypt the single-encrypted secondsymmetric key based at least in part on utilizing the second trusted keyto determine a double-encrypted second symmetric key. The secondencryption request may include the unique second identifier inassociation with the single-encrypted second symmetric key to indicateto the TPM device 108 that the single-encrypted second symmetric key isto be encrypted based at least in part on utilizing the second trustedkey that is associated with (e.g., identified by) the unique secondidentifier.

The second encryption request may also include and/or indicate a resultof the security application 104 verifying biometric information. In anexample, the security application 104 may receive and verify biometricinformation in real time (e.g., while transmitting the second encryptionrequest), as discussed elsewhere herein. When received biometricinformation matches the stored authentic second biometric information,the security application 104 may determine that the received biometricinformation belongs to the second user associated with the second localstorage folder, and may select to transmit the second encryptionrequest. Further, the second encryption request may include and/orindicate the result of the successful verification of the receivedbiometric information.

Based at least in part on receiving the second encryption request, theTPM device 108 may determine, from the included and/or indicated resultof the successful verification, that the received biometric informationmatches the stored authentic second biometric information. Further, theTPM device 108 may determine that the single-encrypted second symmetrickey is to be encrypted by utilizing the second trusted key associatedwith the unique second identifier, as indicated by the second encryptionrequest. As a result, the TPM device 108 may utilize the second trustedkey to encrypt the single-encrypted second symmetric key.

When the second trusted key includes the second trusted symmetric key,the TPM device 108 may utilize the second trusted symmetric key toencrypt the single-encrypted second symmetric key. When the secondtrusted key includes the second trusted key pair, the TPM device 108 mayencrypt the single-encrypted second symmetric key by utilizing thesecond trusted public key to determine the double-encrypted secondsymmetric key.

In some aspects, the TPM device 108 may provide the double-encryptedsecond symmetric key to the security application 104. The securityapplication 104 may store the double-encrypted second symmetric key inthe memory (e.g., memory 630) associated with the multiuser device 102.Because the second trusted public key is associated with the TPM device108, utilizing the second trusted public key to encrypt thesingle-encrypted second symmetric key renders the second local folderdevice-specific such that data stored in the second local folder may beaccessed and/or decrypted by using the multiuser device 102.

As shown by reference numeral 260, the security application 104 mayenable secure authentication for access to data stored in the localfolders. In some aspects, the security application 104 may receive amaster string. The security application 104 may determine which folderis sought to be accessed based at least in part on the received masterstring. In an example, based at least in part on receiving the firstmaster string, the security application 104 may determine that the datastored in the first local folder is to be accessed. Alternatively, basedat least in part on receiving the second master string, the securityapplication may determine that the data stored in the second localfolder is to be accessed.

When data stored in the first local folder is to be accessed and thesecurity application 104 receives the first master string, the securityapplication 104 may determine the first master key based at least inpart on utilizing the first master string. The security application 104may decrypt the first assigned private key based at least in part onutilizing the first master key.

Further, the security application 104 may transmit a first decryptionrequest for the TPM device 108 to decrypt the double-encrypted firstsymmetric key based at least in part on utilizing the first trusted key.The first decryption request may include the unique first identifier(and/or the first trusted public key) in association with thedouble-encrypted first symmetric key to indicate to the TPM device 108that the double-encrypted first symmetric key is to be decrypted basedat least in part on utilizing the first trusted key that is associatedwith (e.g., identified by) the unique identifier (and/or the firsttrusted public key).

The first decryption request may also include and/or indicate a resultof the security application 104 verifying the first biometricinformation. In an example, the security application 104 may receive andverify biometric information in real time (e.g., while transmitting thefirst decryption request), as discussed elsewhere herein. When thereceived biometric information matches the stored authentic firstbiometric information, the security application 104 may determine thatthe received biometric information belongs to the first user associatedwith the first local folder, and may select to transmit the firstdecryption request.

Based at least in part on receiving the first decryption request, theTPM device 108 may determine, from the included and/or indicated resultof the successful verification, that the received biometric informationmatches the stored authentic first biometric information. Further, theTPM device 108 may determine that the double-encrypted first symmetrickey is to be decrypted using the first trusted key associated with theunique first identifier (and/or the first trusted public key), asindicated by the first decryption request. As a result, the TPM device108 may decrypt the double-encrypted first symmetric key based at leastin part on utilizing the first trusted key.

When the first trusted key includes the first trusted symmetric key, theTPM device 108 may utilize the first trusted symmetric key to decryptthe double-encrypted first symmetric key. When the first trusted keyincludes the first trusted key pair, the TPM device 108 may utilize thefirst trusted private key to decrypt the double-encrypted firstsymmetric key. In some aspects, the TPM device 108 may provide thesingle-encrypted first symmetric key, determined based at least in parton decrypting the double-encrypted first symmetric key, to the securityapplication 104.

The security application 104 may utilize the first assigned private keyto decrypt the single-encrypted symmetric key to determine the firstsymmetric key. The security application 104 may utilize the firstsymmetric key to decrypt the first local folder, thereby enabling accessto the data stored in the first local folder. In this way, the securityapplication 104 may securely authenticate the first user and provideaccess to data stored in the first local folder.

Similarly, when data stored in the second local folder is to be accessedand the security application 104 receives the second master string, thesecurity application 104 may determine the second master key based atleast in part on utilizing the second master string. The securityapplication 104 may decrypt the second assigned private key based atleast in part on utilizing the second master key.

Further, the security application 104 may transmit a second decryptionrequest for the TPM device 108 to decrypt the double-encrypted secondsymmetric key based at least in part on utilizing the second trustedkey. The second decryption request may include the unique secondidentifier (and/or the second trusted public key) in association withthe double-encrypted second symmetric key to indicate to the TPM device108 that the double-encrypted second symmetric key is to be decryptedbased at least in part on utilizing the second trusted key that isassociated with (e.g., identified by) the unique identifier (and/or thesecond trusted public key).

The second decryption request may also include and/or indicate a resultof the security application 104 verifying the second biometricinformation. In an example, the security application 104 may receive andverify biometric information in real time (e.g., while transmitting thesecond decryption request), as discussed elsewhere herein. When thereceived biometric information matches the stored authentic secondbiometric information, the security application 104 may determine thatthe received biometric information belongs to the second user associatedwith the second local storage folder, and may select to transmit thesecond decryption request.

Based at least in part on receiving the second decryption request, theTPM device 108 may determine, from the included and/or indicated resultof the successful verification, that the received biometric informationmatches the stored authentic second biometric information. Further, theTPM device 108 may determine that the double-encrypted second symmetrickey is to be decrypted using the second trusted key associated with theunique second identifier (and/or the second trusted public key), asindicated by the second decryption request. As a result, the TPM device108 may decrypt the double-encrypted second symmetric key based at leastin part on utilizing the second trusted key.

When the second trusted key includes the second trusted symmetric key,the TPM device 108 may utilize the second trusted symmetric key todecrypt the double-encrypted second symmetric key. When the secondtrusted key includes the second trusted key pair, the TPM device 108 mayutilize the second trusted private key to decrypt the double-encryptedsecond symmetric key. In some aspects, the TPM device 108 may providethe single-encrypted second symmetric key, determined based at least inpart on decrypting the double-encrypted second symmetric key, to thesecurity application 104.

The security application 104 may utilize the second assigned private keyto decrypt the single-encrypted symmetric key to determine the secondsymmetric key. The security application 104 may utilize the secondsymmetric key to decrypt the second local folder, thereby enablingaccess to the data stored in the second local folder. In this way, thesecurity application 104 may securely authenticate the second user andprovide access to data stored in the second local folder.

Through secure authentication based at least in part on utilizingrespective cryptographic keys, a biometric unit (e.g., biometricinformation), and/or a TPM device to encrypt and/or to decryptrespective local folders associated with the respective multiple usersof a multiuser device, the security application may avoid a first userfrom accessing second private data (associated with a second user) viathe first user's access to the multiuser device, thereby preventing thesecond private data from becoming compromised. Similarly, the securityapplication may avoid a second user from accessing first private data(associated with the first user) via the second user's access to themultiuser device, thereby preventing the first private data frombecoming compromised. As a result, the security application may enableprotection of integrity associated with the first private data and/orthe second private data, and enable the multiuser device and/or the DSSPto efficiently expend resources (e.g., management resources, memoryresources, computational/processing resources, power consumptionresources, system bandwidth, network resources, financial resources,time resources, etc.) to perform suitable tasks associated withproviding the cyber security services.

As indicated above, FIG. 2 is provided as an example. Other examples maydiffer from what is described with regard to FIG. 2 .

FIG. 3 is an illustration of an example process 300 associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure. In some aspects, the process 300 maybe performed by a memory and/or a processor/controller (e.g., processor620) associated with a user device (e.g., multiuser device 102)executing a security application. As shown by reference numeral 310,process 300 may include decrypting, by a user device based at least inpart on utilizing a master key, an assigned private key associated withthe user device. For instance, the user device may utilize theassociated processor/controller to decrypt, based at least in part onutilizing a master key, an assigned private key associated with the userdevice, as discussed elsewhere herein.

As shown by reference numeral 320, process 300 may include decrypting,by a user device based at least in part on utilizing a trusted key, adouble-encrypted symmetric key to determine a single-encrypted symmetrickey. For instance, the user device may utilize the associatedprocessor/controller to decrypt, based at least in part on utilizing atrusted key, a double-encrypted symmetric key to determine asingle-encrypted symmetric key, as discussed elsewhere herein.

As shown by reference numeral 330, process 300 may include decrypting,by the user device based at least in part on utilizing the assignedprivate key, the single-encrypted symmetric key to determine a symmetrickey. For instance, the user device may utilize the associatedprocessor/controller to decrypt, based at least in part on utilizing theassigned private key, the single-encrypted symmetric key to determine asymmetric key, as discussed elsewhere herein.

As shown by reference numeral 340, process 300 may include decrypting,by the user device based at least in part on utilizing the symmetrickey, an encrypted folder stored on the user device to provide access todata included in the encrypted folder. For instance, the user device mayutilize the associated processor/controller to decrypt, based at leastin part on utilizing the symmetric key, an encrypted folder stored onthe user device to provide access to data included in the encryptedfolder, as discussed elsewhere herein.

Process 300 may include additional aspects, such as any single aspect orany combination of aspects described below and/or in connection with oneor more other processes described elsewhere herein.

In a first aspect, in process 300, decrypting the double-encryptedsymmetric key includes verifying biometric information associated withthe encrypted folder.

In a second aspect, alone or in combination with the first aspect, inprocess 300, decrypting the double-encrypted symmetric key includescausing a biometric unit, associated with the user device, to receivebiometric information, and comparing the received biometric informationwith stored authentic biometric information.

In a third aspect, alone or in combination with the first through secondaspects, in process 300, decrypting the double-encrypted symmetric keyincludes a processor associated with the user device transmitting arequest to a trusted device associated with the user device, the requestindicating that the double-encrypted symmetric key is to be decryptedbased at least in part on utilizing the trusted key.

In a fourth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through thirdaspects, in process 300, decrypting the double-encrypted symmetric keyincludes a processor associated with the user device transmitting arequest to a trusted device associated with the user device, the requestindicating successful verification of biometric information associatedwith the encrypted folder.

In a fifth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through fourthaspects, process 300 includes associating decryption of thedouble-encrypted symmetric key with verification of biometricinformation associated with the encrypted folder.

In a sixth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through fifthaspects, process 300 includes determining the master key based at leastin part on receiving a master string associated with the encryptedfolder.

Although FIG. 3 shows example blocks of the process, in some aspects,the process may include additional blocks, fewer blocks, differentblocks, or differently arranged blocks than those depicted in FIG. 3 .Additionally, or alternatively, two or more of the blocks of the processmay be performed in parallel.

As indicated above, FIG. 3 is provided as an example. Other examples maydiffer from what is described with regard to FIG. 3 .

FIG. 4 is an illustration of an example process 400 associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure. In some aspects, the process 400 maybe performed by a memory and/or a processor/controller (e.g., processor620) associated with a user device (e.g., multiuser device 102)executing a security application. As shown by reference numeral 410,process 400 may include encrypting, by a user device based at least inpart on utilizing a symmetric key, a folder stored on the user device.For instance, the user device may utilize the associated memory andprocessor to encrypt, based at least in part on utilizing a symmetrickey, a folder stored on the user device, as discussed elsewhere herein.

As shown by reference numeral 420, process 400 may include encrypting,by the user device based at least in part on utilizing an assignedpublic key associated with the user device, the symmetric key todetermine a single-encrypted symmetric key. For instance, the userdevice may utilize the associated memory and processor to encrypt, basedat least in part on utilizing an assigned public key associated with theuser device, the symmetric key to determine a single-encrypted symmetrickey, as discussed elsewhere herein.

As shown by reference numeral 430, process 400 may include encrypting,by the user device based at least in part on utilizing a trusted keyspecific to the user device, the first-encrypted symmetric key todetermine a double-encrypted symmetric key. For instance, the userdevice may utilize the associated memory and processor to encrypt, basedat least in part on utilizing a trusted key specific to the user device,the first-encrypted symmetric key to determine a double-encryptedsymmetric key, as discussed elsewhere herein.

As shown by reference numeral 440, process 400 may include storing, byuser device, the double-encrypted symmetric key in an associated memory.For instance, the user device may utilize the associated memory andprocessor to store the double-encrypted symmetric key in an associatedmemory, as discussed elsewhere herein.

Process 400 may include additional aspects, such as any single aspect orany combination of aspects described below and/or in connection with oneor more other processes described elsewhere herein.

In a first aspect, in process 400, encrypting the single-encryptedsymmetric key includes verifying biometric information associated withthe folder.

In a second aspect, alone or in combination with the first aspect, inprocess 400, encrypting the single-encrypted symmetric key includescausing a biometric unit, associated with the user device, to receivebiometric information, and comparing the received biometric informationwith stored authentic biometric information.

In a third aspect, alone or in combination with the first through secondaspects, in process 400, encrypting the single-encrypted symmetric keyincludes transmitting a request to a trusted device associated with theuser device, the request indicating that the single-encrypted symmetrickey is to be encrypted based at least in part on utilizing the trustedkey.

In a fourth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through thirdaspects, in process 400, encrypting the single-encrypted symmetric keyincludes transmitting a request to a trusted device associated with theuser device, the request indicating successful verification of biometricinformation associated with the folder.

In a fifth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through fourthaspects, process 400 includes associating encryption of thesingle-encrypted symmetric key with verification of biometricinformation associated with the folder.

In a sixth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through fifthaspects, process 400 includes determining a master key to encrypt anassigned private key associated with the assigned public key.

Although FIG. 4 shows example blocks of the process, in some aspects,the process may include additional blocks, fewer blocks, differentblocks, or differently arranged blocks than those depicted in FIG. 4 .Additionally, or alternatively, two or more of the blocks of the processmay be performed in parallel.

As indicated above, FIG. 4 is provided as an example. Other examples maydiffer from what is described with regard to FIG. 4 .

FIG. 5 is an illustration of an example process 500 associated with anauthentication system for a multiuser device, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure. In some aspects, the process 500 maybe performed by a memory and/or a processor/controller (e.g., processor620) associated with a user device (e.g., multiuser device 102)executing a security application. As shown by reference numeral 510,process 500 may include encrypting, by a multiuser device, a firstfolder based at least in part on utilizing a first symmetric key and asecond folder based at least in part on utilizing a second symmetrickey, the first folder and the second folder being stored on themultiuser device. For instance, the user device may utilize theassociated memory and processor to encrypt a first folder based at leastin part on utilizing a first symmetric key and a second folder based atleast in part on utilizing a second symmetric key, the first folder andthe second folder being stored on the multiuser device, as discussedelsewhere herein.

As shown by reference numeral 520, process 500 may include encrypting,by the multiuser device, the first symmetric key based at least in parton utilizing a first trusted key and the second symmetric key based atleast in part on utilizing a second trusted key. For instance, the userdevice may utilize the associated memory and processor to encrypt thefirst symmetric key based at least in part on utilizing a first trustedkey and the second symmetric key based at least in part on utilizing asecond trusted key, as discussed elsewhere herein.

As shown by reference numeral 530, process 500 may include providingaccess, by the multiuser device, to the encrypted first folder bydecrypting the encrypted first symmetric key based at least in part onverifying first biometric information and to the encrypted second folderby decrypting the encrypted second symmetric key based at least in parton verifying second biometric information, the first biometricinformation being different from the second biometric information. Forinstance, the user device may utilize the associated memory andprocessor to provide access to the encrypted first folder by decryptingthe encrypted first symmetric key based at least in part on verifyingfirst biometric information and to the encrypted second folder bydecrypting the encrypted second symmetric key based at least in part onverifying second biometric information, the first biometric informationbeing different from the second biometric information, as discussedelsewhere herein.

Process 500 may include additional aspects, such as any single aspect orany combination of aspects described below and/or in connection with oneor more other processes described elsewhere herein.

In a first aspect, in process 500, decrypting the encrypted firstsymmetric key includes causing a biometric unit, associated with themultiuser device, to receive the first biometric information, anddecrypting the encrypted second symmetric key includes causing thebiometric unit to receive the second biometric information.

In a second aspect, alone or in combination with the first aspect, inprocess 500, decrypting the encrypted first symmetric key includescomparing the first biometric information with authentic first biometricinformation, and decrypting the encrypted second symmetric key includescomparing the second biometric information with authentic secondbiometric information.

In a third aspect, alone or in combination with the first through secondaspects, in process 500, decrypting the encrypted first symmetric keyincludes transmitting a first request to a trusted device associatedwith the multiuser device, the first request indicating that theencrypted first symmetric key is to be decrypted based at least in parton utilizing the first trusted key, and decrypting the encrypted secondsymmetric key includes transmitting a second request to the trusteddevice, the second request indicating that the encrypted secondsymmetric key is to be decrypted based at least in part on utilizing thesecond trusted key, the first trusted key being different from thesecond trusted key.

In a fourth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through thirdaspects, in process 500, decrypting the encrypted first symmetric keyincludes transmitting a first request to a trusted device associatedwith the multiuser device, the first request indicating successfulverification of the first biometric information, and decrypting theencrypted second symmetric key includes transmitting a second request tothe trusted device, the second request indicating successfulverification of the second biometric information.

In a fifth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through fourthaspects, in process 500, providing access to the encrypted first folderincludes decrypting the encrypted first symmetric key based at least inpart on utilizing an assigned private key associated with the multiuserdevice, and providing access to the encrypted second folder includesdecrypting the encrypted second symmetric key based at least in part onutilizing the assigned private key.

In a sixth aspect, alone or in combination with the first through fifthaspects, process 500 may include associating decrypting of the encryptedfirst symmetric key with verification of the first biometricinformation, and associating decrypting of the encrypted secondsymmetric key with verification of the second biometric information.

Although FIG. 5 shows example blocks of the process, in some aspects,the process may include additional blocks, fewer blocks, differentblocks, or differently arranged blocks than those depicted in FIG. 5 .Additionally, or alternatively, two or more of the blocks of the processmay be performed in parallel.

As indicated above, FIG. 5 is provided as an example. Other examples maydiffer from what is described with regard to FIG. 5 .

FIG. 6 is an illustration of example devices 600, according to variousaspects of the present disclosure. In some aspects, the example devices600 may form part of or implement the systems, environments,infrastructures, components, or the like described elsewhere herein andmay be used to perform the example processes described elsewhere herein.The example devices 600 may include a universal bus 610 communicativelycoupling a processor 620, a memory 630, a storage component 640, aninput component 650, an output component 660, and a communicationinterface 670.

Bus 610 may include a component that permits communication amongmultiple components of a device 600. Processor 620 may be implemented inhardware, firmware, and/or a combination of hardware and software.Processor 620 may take the form of a central processing unit (CPU), agraphics processing unit (GPU), an accelerated processing unit (APU), amicroprocessor, a microcontroller, a digital signal processor (DSP), afield-programmable gate array (FPGA), an application-specific integratedcircuit (ASIC), or another type of processing component. In someaspects, processor 620 may include one or more processors capable ofbeing programmed to perform a function. Memory 630 may include a randomaccess memory (RAM), a read only memory (ROM), and/or another type ofdynamic or static storage device (e.g., a flash memory, a magneticmemory, and/or an optical memory) that stores information and/orinstructions for use by processor 620.

Storage component 640 may store information and/or software related tothe operation and use of a device 600. For example, storage component640 may include a hard disk (e.g., a magnetic disk, an optical disk,and/or a magneto-optic disk), a solid state drive (SSD), a compact disc(CD), a digital versatile disc (DVD), a floppy disk, a cartridge, amagnetic tape, and/or another type of non-transitory computer-readablemedium, along with a corresponding drive.

Input component 650 may include a component that permits a device 600 toreceive information, such as via user input (e.g., a touch screendisplay, a keyboard, a keypad, a mouse, a button, a switch, and/or amicrophone). Additionally, or alternatively, input component 650 mayinclude a component for determining location (e.g., a global positioningsystem (GPS) component) and/or a sensor (e.g., an accelerometer, agyroscope, an actuator, another type of positional or environmentalsensor, and/or the like). Output component 660 may include a componentthat provides output information from device 600 (via, for example, adisplay, a speaker, a haptic feedback component, an audio or visualindicator, and/or the like).

Communication interface 670 may include a transceiver-like component(e.g., a transceiver, a separate receiver, a separate transmitter,and/or the like) that enables a device 600 to communicate with otherdevices, such as via a wired connection, a wireless connection, or acombination of wired and wireless connections. Communication interface670 may permit device 600 to receive information from another deviceand/or provide information to another device. For example, communicationinterface 670 may include an Ethernet interface, an optical interface, acoaxial interface, an infrared interface, a radio frequency (RF)interface, a universal serial bus (USB) interface, a Wi-Fi interface, acellular network interface, and/or the like.

A device 600 may perform one or more processes described elsewhereherein. A device 600 may perform these processes based on processor 620executing software instructions stored by a non-transitorycomputer-readable medium, such as memory 630 and/or storage component640. As used herein, the term “computer-readable medium” may refer to anon-transitory memory device. A memory device may include memory spacewithin a single physical storage device or memory space spread acrossmultiple physical storage devices.

Software instructions may be read into memory 630 and/or storagecomponent 640 from another computer-readable medium or from anotherdevice via communication interface 670. When executed, softwareinstructions stored in memory 630 and/or storage component 640 may causeprocessor 620 to perform one or more processes described elsewhereherein. Additionally, or alternatively, hardware circuitry may be usedin place of or in combination with software instructions to perform oneor more processes described elsewhere herein. Thus, implementationsdescribed herein are not limited to any specific combination of hardwarecircuitry and software.

The quantity and arrangement of components shown in FIG. 6 are providedas an example. In practice, a device 600 may include additionalcomponents, fewer components, different components, or differentlyarranged components than those shown in FIG. 6 . Additionally, oralternatively, a set of components (e.g., one or more components) of adevice 600 may perform one or more functions described as beingperformed by another set of components of a device 600.

As indicated above, FIG. 6 is provided as an example. Other examples maydiffer from what is described with regard to FIG. 6 .

Persons of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the aspectsencompassed by the present disclosure are not limited to the particularexemplary aspects described herein. In that regard, althoughillustrative aspects have been shown and described, a wide range ofmodification, change, and substitution is contemplated in the foregoingdisclosure. It is understood that such variations may be made to theaspects without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.Accordingly, it is appropriate that the appended claims be construedbroadly and in a manner consistent with the present disclosure.

The foregoing disclosure provides illustration and description, but isnot intended to be exhaustive or to limit the aspects to the preciseform disclosed. Modifications and variations may be made in light of theabove disclosure or may be acquired from practice of the aspects.

As used herein, the term “component” is intended to be broadly construedas hardware, firmware, or a combination of hardware and software. Asused herein, a processor is implemented in hardware, firmware, or acombination of hardware and software.

As used herein, satisfying a threshold may, depending on the context,refer to a value being greater than the threshold, greater than or equalto the threshold, less than the threshold, less than or equal to thethreshold, equal to the threshold, or not equal to the threshold, amongother examples, or combinations thereof.

It will be apparent that systems or methods described herein may beimplemented in different forms of hardware, firmware, or a combinationof hardware and software. The actual specialized control hardware orsoftware code used to implement these systems or methods is not limitingof the aspects. Thus, the operation and behavior of the systems ormethods were described herein without reference to specific softwarecode—it being understood that software and hardware can be designed toimplement the systems or methods based, at least in part, on thedescription herein.

Even though particular combinations of features are recited in theclaims or disclosed in the specification, these combinations are notintended to limit the disclosure of various aspects. In fact, many ofthese features may be combined in ways not specifically recited in theclaims or disclosed in the specification. Although each dependent claimlisted below may directly depend on only one claim, the disclosure ofvarious aspects includes each dependent claim in combination with everyother claim in the claim set. A phrase referring to “at least one of” alist of items refers to any combination of those items, including singlemembers. As an example, “at least one of: a, b, or c” is intended tocover a, b, c, a-b, a-c, b-c, and a-b-c, as well as any combination withmultiples of the same element (for example, a-a, a-a-a, a-a-b, a-a-c,a-b-b, a-c-c, b-b, b-b-b, b-b-c, c-c, and c-c-c or any other ordering ofa, b, and c).

No element, act, or instruction used herein should be construed ascritical or essential unless explicitly described as such. Also, as usedherein, the articles “a” and “an” are intended to include one or moreitems, and may be used interchangeably with “one or more.” Further, asused herein, the article “the” is intended to include one or more itemsreferenced in connection with the article “the” and may be usedinterchangeably with “the one or more.” Furthermore, as used herein, theterm “set” is intended to include one or more items (e.g., relateditems, unrelated items, a combination of related and unrelated items,etc.), and may be used interchangeably with “one or more.” Where onlyone item is intended, the phrase “only one” or similar language is used.Also, as used herein, the terms “has,” “have,” “having,” or the like areintended to be open-ended terms. Further, the phrase “based on” isintended to mean “based, at least in part, on” unless explicitly statedotherwise. Also, as used herein, the term “or” is intended to beinclusive when used in a series and may be used interchangeably with“and/or,” unless explicitly stated otherwise (e.g., if used incombination with “either” or “only one of”).

1. A method, comprising: encrypting, by a multiuser device, a firstfolder based at least in part on utilizing a first symmetric key and asecond folder based at least in part on utilizing a second symmetrickey, the first folder and the second folder being stored on themultiuser device; encrypting, by the multiuser device, the firstsymmetric key based at least in part on utilizing a first trusted keyand the second symmetric key based at least in part on utilizing asecond trusted key; and providing access, by the multiuser device, tothe encrypted first folder by decrypting the encrypted first symmetrickey based at least in part on verifying first biometric information andto the encrypted second folder by decrypting the encrypted secondsymmetric key based at least in part on verifying second biometricinformation, the first biometric information being different from thesecond biometric information.
 2. The method of claim 1, whereindecrypting the encrypted first symmetric key includes causing abiometric unit, associated with the multiuser device, to receive thefirst biometric information, and decrypting the encrypted secondsymmetric key includes causing the biometric unit to receive the secondbiometric information.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein decrypting theencrypted first symmetric key includes comparing the first biometricinformation with authentic first biometric information, and decryptingthe encrypted second symmetric key includes comparing the secondbiometric information with authentic second biometric information. 4.The method of claim 1, wherein decrypting the encrypted first symmetrickey includes transmitting a first request to a trusted device associatedwith the multiuser device, the first request indicating that theencrypted first symmetric key is to be decrypted based at least in parton utilizing the first trusted key, and decrypting the encrypted secondsymmetric key includes transmitting a second request to the trusteddevice, the second request indicating that the encrypted secondsymmetric key is to be decrypted based at least in part on utilizing thesecond trusted key, the first trusted key being different from thesecond trusted key.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein decrypting theencrypted first symmetric key includes transmitting a first request to atrusted device associated with the multiuser device, the first requestindicating successful verification of the first biometric information,and decrypting the encrypted second symmetric key includes transmittinga second request to the trusted device, the second request indicatingsuccessful verification of the second biometric information.
 6. Themethod of claim 1, wherein providing access to the encrypted firstfolder includes decrypting the encrypted first symmetric key based atleast in part on utilizing a first assigned private key, and providingaccess to the encrypted second folder includes decrypting the encryptedsecond symmetric key based at least in part on utilizing a secondassigned private key.
 7. The method of claim 1, further comprising:associating decrypting of the encrypted first symmetric key withverification of the first biometric information, and associatingdecrypting of the encrypted second symmetric key with verification ofthe second biometric information.
 8. A multiuser device, comprising: amemory; and a processor communicatively coupled to the memory, thememory and the processor being configured to: encrypt a first folderbased at least in part on utilizing a first symmetric key and a secondfolder based at least in part on utilizing a second symmetric key, thefirst folder and the second folder being stored in the memory; encryptthe first symmetric key based at least in part on utilizing a firsttrusted key and the second symmetric key based at least in part onutilizing a second trusted key; and provide access to the encryptedfirst folder by decrypting the encrypted first symmetric key based atleast in part on verifying first biometric information and to theencrypted second folder by decrypting the encrypted second symmetric keybased at least in part on verifying second biometric information, thefirst biometric information being different from the second biometricinformation.
 9. The multiuser device of claim 8, wherein, to decrypt theencrypted first symmetric key, the memory and the processor areconfigured to cause a biometric unit, associated with the multiuserdevice, to receive the first biometric information, and to decrypt theencrypted second symmetric key, the memory and the processor areconfigured to cause the biometric unit to receive the second biometricinformation.
 10. The multiuser device of claim 8, wherein, to decryptthe encrypted first symmetric key, the memory and the processor areconfigured to compare the first biometric information with authenticfirst biometric information, and to decrypt the encrypted secondsymmetric key, the memory and the processor are configured to comparethe second biometric information with authentic second biometricinformation.
 11. The multiuser device of claim 8, wherein, to decryptthe encrypted first symmetric key, the memory and the processor areconfigured to transmit a first request to a trusted device associatedwith the multiuser device, the first request indicating that theencrypted first symmetric key is to be decrypted based at least in parton utilizing the first trusted key, and to decrypt the encrypted secondsymmetric key, the memory and the processor are configured to transmit asecond request to the trusted device, the second request indicating thatthe encrypted second symmetric key is to be decrypted based at least inpart on utilizing the second trusted key.
 12. The multiuser device ofclaim 8, wherein, to decrypt the encrypted first symmetric key, thememory and processor are configured to transmit a first request to atrusted device associated with the multiuser device, the first requestindicating successful verification of the first biometric information,and to decrypt the encrypted second symmetric key, the memory andprocessor are configured to transmit a second request to the trusteddevice, the second request indicating successful verification of thesecond biometric information.
 13. The multiuser device of claim 8,wherein, to provide access to the encrypted first folder, the memory andprocessor are configured to decrypt the encrypted first symmetric keybased at least in part on utilizing a first assigned private key, and toprovide access to the encrypted second folder, the memory and processorare configured to decrypt the encrypted second symmetric key based atleast in part on utilizing a second assigned private key.
 14. Themultiuser device of claim 8, wherein the memory and the processor areconfigured to: associate decrypting of the encrypted first symmetric keywith verification of the first biometric information, and associatedecrypting of the encrypted second symmetric key with verification ofthe second biometric information.
 15. A non-transitory computer-readablemedium configured to store instructions, which when executed by aprocessor associated with a multiuser device, configure the processorto: encrypt a first folder based at least in part on utilizing a firstsymmetric key and a second folder based at least in part on utilizing asecond symmetric key, the first folder and the second folder beingstored in an associated memory; encrypt the first symmetric key based atleast in part on utilizing a first trusted key and the second symmetrickey based at least in part on utilizing a second trusted key; andprovide access to the encrypted first folder by decrypting the encryptedfirst symmetric key based at least in part on verifying first biometricinformation and to the encrypted second folder by decrypting theencrypted second symmetric key based at least in part on verifyingsecond biometric information, the first biometric information beingdifferent from the second biometric information.
 16. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein, to decrypt the encryptedfirst symmetric key, the processor is configured to cause a biometricunit, associated with the multiuser device, to receive the firstbiometric information, and to decrypt the encrypted second symmetrickey, the processor is configured to cause the biometric unit to receivethe second biometric information.
 17. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein, to decrypt the encryptedfirst symmetric key, the processor is configured to compare the firstbiometric information with authentic first biometric information, and todecrypt the encrypted second symmetric key, the processor is configuredto compare the second biometric information with authentic secondbiometric information.
 18. The non-transitory computer-readable mediumof claim 15, wherein, to decrypt the encrypted first symmetric key, theprocessor is configured to transmit a first request to a trusted deviceassociated with the multiuser device, the first request indicating thatthe encrypted first symmetric key is to be decrypted based at least inpart on utilizing the first trusted key, and to decrypt the encryptedsecond symmetric key, the processor is configured to transmit a secondrequest to the trusted device, the second request indicating that theencrypted second symmetric key is to be decrypted based at least in parton utilizing the second trusted key.
 19. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein, to decrypt the encryptedfirst symmetric key, the processor is configured to transmit a firstrequest to a trusted device associated with the multiuser device, thefirst request indicating successful verification of the first biometricinformation, and to decrypt the encrypted second symmetric key, theprocessor is configured to transmit a second request to the trusteddevice, the second request indicating successful verification of thesecond biometric information.
 20. The non-transitory computer-readablemedium of claim 15, wherein, to provide access to the encrypted firstfolder, the processor is configured to decrypt the encrypted firstsymmetric key based at least in part on utilizing a first assignedprivate key, and to provide access to the encrypted second folder, theprocessor is configured to decrypt the encrypted second symmetric keybased at least in part on utilizing a second assigned private key.